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L The Search and the Results
A. Introduction
Like many new judges, I try to read as much as I can about the
judicial process. I was disappointed to find that while much has been
written about judicial philosophies of famous appellate court judges
and their modes of decision-making, little has been written about
trial court fact-finding.
What seems to have been ignored in the literature is the deci-
sion-making process employed by trial judges in proceedings where
questions of both fact and law must be resolved. Whether it be a
preliminary injunction hearing, a suppression hearing, or a bench
trial, the process of adjudication is the same: a trial judge hears sworn
testimony and makes both factual and legal determinations. We
know that a result must be reached to resolve conflicting positions of
litigants, but know little or nothing about the methods used by trial
judges to arrive at the result.
B. Appellate Court Decisions
The process by which a trial judge adjudicates non-jury fact is-
sues should not be confused with the various processes by which ap-
* A.B. 1970, Franklin and Marshall College; J.D. cum laude 1974, New York Law
School; LL.M.1975, Southern Methodist University; Judge of the Court of Claims, Acting
Justice of the Supreme Court, State of New York, 1995-Present; Adjunct Professor of
Law, Syracuse University.
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pellate courts "make law." The facts are already provided to appel-
late judges before their application of the judicial process even be-
gins. Many scholars have written extensively on this subject.' In-
deed, Cardozo equated the judicial process with the appellate
process.! Yet, while the primary job of appellate judges might be to
make law, trial judges make results, and, absent reversal, litigants
have to live with the results forever.
C. The Absence of Method Literature
Over sixty years ago, then attorney and later federal appellate
judge Jerome Frank,3 the only person who has ever written exten-
sively on fact-finding,4 predicted that a new technique of judging, to
address the personal element in fact-finding and decision-making,
would be slow in coming: "Just what form a new technique of judging
will take, it is too soon to guess. And the same may be said of conjec-
tures as to how long it will be before such a technique can become ef-
fective. It would not be wise to be over-optimistic."5
1. See generally BENJAMIN CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS
(1921); H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW (1961); Oliver W. Holmes, The Path of the
Law, 10 HARV. L. REV. 457 (1897); John W. Poulos, The Judicial Philosophy of Roger
Traynor, 46 HASTINGS L.J. 1643 (1995); Robert N. Wilentz, Judicial Legitimacy, 49
RUTGERS L. REV. 859 (1997); CHARLES A. MILLER, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE
USES OF HISTORY (1969); Robert N. Wilentz, Judicial Legitimacy - Finding the Law, 8
SETON HALL LEGIS. J. 221 (1985); 1 ROSCOE POUND, JURISPRUDENCE (1959).
2. Cardozo said that "no judge of a high court worthy of his office, views the func-
tion of his place so narrowly," see CARDOZO, supra note 1, at 20 (emphasis added),
thereby defining the process about which he was speaking.
3. Appointed by President Roosevelt in 1941 as Judge of the United States Court of
Appeals for the Second Circuit.
4. See generally JEROME FRANK, LAW AND THE MODERN MIND (1930); JEROME
FRANK, IF MEN WERE ANGELS (1942); Jerome Frank, What Courts Do In Fact, 26 U.
ILL. L. REV. 645 (1932).
5. FRANK, LAW AND THE MODERN MIND, supra note 4, at 113. Frank also wrote
that a judge's personality determines the outcome of a case, and it is therefore crucial for
litigants to know that personality. See id. at 111. Frank believed that "we must know
thoroughly that complicated congeries we loosely call the judge's personality" but won-
dered if "mere recognition" of this reality was enough. Id. at 111-15. Frank continues:
If the personality of the judge is the pivotal factor in law administration, then
law may vary with the personality of the judge who happens to pass upon any
given case. How much variation there is, as we pass from judge to judge, is not,
as matters now stand, discoverable, because of the method of reporting cases
and the verbal contrivances used by the judges which conceal judicial dishar-
mony. We have little statistical material in this field. For the most part, we must
fall back on the impressions of lawyers, impressions of the kind which do not of-
ten find their way into print.
Id. Frank's answer to this rhetorical lament was, of course, in the negative. See id. at 111-
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Frank's clairvoyance is remarkable. In the six decades since his
pessimistic prediction, much has been written about judicial philoso-
phy and almost nothing has been written about the fact-finding as-
pect of trial court decision-making. 6 A law school course book enti-
tled "The Judicial Process" devotes a section to "subjective
influences," but merely reproduces what has already been written
about appellate court decision-making by Roscoe Pound, Karl
Llewellyn, Felix Frankfurter, and others.7 An entire bibliography
published in 1993 of every book and article ever written about judi-
cial decision- making contains no source on fact-finding by trial
courts.8
Frank wrote in 1932 that "[t]alks with candid judges have begun
to disclose that, whatever is said in opinions, the judge often arrives
at his decision before he tries to explain it." 9 In 1972 U.S. District
Judge Charles Wyzanski, Jr. said the only important job a trial judge
does is fact-finding and boasted, as if he were unique, that he never
"fudged the facts."1 In 1990, in a book entitled "Judging," U.S. Dis-
trict Judge Robert Keeton wrote that "legal professionals-all of us
and not just the judges among us-have been less candid and re-
sourceful than we should be in explaining judging both among our-
selves and to others."'1 Not even the autobiographies of judges dis-
close processes of fact-finding and decision-making.'2 And, just three
years ago it was observed that mystery surrounds the process of deci-
sion-making because of judges' "reluctance" and "reticence" to write
about the process, and that there are no 'how to' manuals for judges
on how to decide cases, 3 even for distribution at a course entitled
"Decision Making for Judges.'
4
6. See generally FRANK, LAW AND THE MODERN MIND, supra note 4; FRANK, IF
MEN WERE ANGELS, supra note 4; Frank, What the Courts Do in Fact, supra note 4;
Henry J. Friendly, Reactions of a Lawyer-Newly Become Judge, 71 YALE L.J. 218 (1961);
Harold R. Medina, The Trial Judge's Notes: A Study in Judicial Administration, 49
CORNELL L.Q. 1 (1963); Leonard B. Sand, Trial by Non-Jury, 13 LrrIG. 5 (1987).
7. See RUGGERO ALDISERT, THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 389-421 (1976).
8. See Shirley S. Abrahamson et al. , Judges on Judging - A Bibliography, 24 ST.
MARY's L.J. 995 (1993).
9. Frank, What Courts Do In Fact, supra note 4, at 653.
10. Charles E. Wyzanski, An Activist Judge Mea Maxima Culpa. Apologia Pro Vita
Mea, 7 GA. L. REV. 202, 212 (1972). Judge Wyzanski defined "fudging the facts" as
reaching a desired result and then making findings of fact to support it. See id.
11. ROBERT KEETON, JUDGING 3 (West 1990).
12. See, e.g., BERNARD BOTEIN, TRIAL JUDGE (1952); IRVING YOUNGER, SOME OF
MY LIFE (1991).
13. Philip J. Grib, The Ethical Foundations of Judicial Decision-Making, 35 CATH.
LAW. 1, 1, 7 (1991).
14. National Judicial College, Decision Making, July 27-August 1, 1997.
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Methods for trial court fact-finding and decision-making, to the
extent they may be identifiable, should be very important to practic-
ing lawyers. Familiarity with those processes by which trial judges
adjudicate fact and law issues, whether deduction, induction, intui-
tion, or shooting from the hip, would naturally be of enormous help
to the litigator. The problem appears to be that the lawyers who be-
come trial judges, particularly those trial judges with decades of ex-
perience, rarely write about fact-finding or return to the active prac-
tice of law to share their experiences with practicing lawyers.
D. The Importance of Method
Judge Keeton introduces his book on the subject of judging by
stressing the importance of a judge's "commitment to method." 5
The problem for those seeking to read about method is that the
commitment to method is rarely, if ever, committed to writing, and
when it is, it is about legal analysis. 6
Most judges strive to be fair and appear to be fair so that the liti-
gants walk away with a sense that they were fully heard, their posi-
tions were fully considered, and the decision-maker properly applied
what he or she honestly believed to be the pertinent rules.' Are
there specific methods of trial court fact-finding and decision-making
which enhance the likelihood of achieving these goals as well as a re-
sult which will be affirmed on appeal? Does the practicing lawyer
have a role in molding techniques by requesting the opportunity to
present a case in a particular way which facilitates achievement of
these goals? An affirmative answer to both questions with an expla-
nation based upon an admittedly brief three-and-a-half years of expe-
rience as a judge is what follows.
15. The quality of judging in a legal system depends on commitment. It depends,
first, on commitment to the aim of justice. Second, it depends on commitment to
professionalism. The declared beliefs of all professionals in the system-includ-
ing advocates, counselors, and academic critics as well as judges-affect the
quality of judging in the system. Third, the quality of judging depends on com-
mitment to method. Judicial choice, at its best, is reasoned choice, candidly ex-
plained.
KEETON, supra note 11, at 1.
16. According to Judge Keeton: "Thus, to understand the role of judge fully, one
must understand the judge's use of law. Exploration of the method-or methods if you
prefer-of judging lawfully is the principal subject matter of this book." Id. at 17.
17. Goals of a trial court have been expressed as: (1) Fair treatment of all litigants by
the court; (2) Timely disposition consistent with the circumstances of the individual case;
(3) Enhancement of the quality of the litigation process; (4) Public confidence in the court
as an institution. ABA JUDICIAL DIVISION, LITIGATION CONTROL: THE TRIAL JUDGE'S
KEY TO AVOIDING DELAY 15 (1996).
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E. Benefits of Structured Methods
The very existence of a process makes it possible to disclose it to
those whom it may affect. Thus, the lawyers, litigants, and the gen-
eral public will know, ahead of time, the method by which the matter
is to be decided. The consistent application of methods is more likely
to foster consistency in treatment of litigants and increase the
chances of consistency of results in similar cases. Equally important
is that disclosure of process fosters openness in the operation of a
court as a governmental institution. Openness of the determination
process promotes a feeling of legitimacy about the institution which,
in turn, breeds respect for the judicial system.
From the litigants' perspective, the only governmental institution
whose process of decision-making is of any concern is the court
where their cause is pending. Litigants don't care much about the
overall court system or the highest court in the state or whether
judges are elected or appointed. They care about the dispute at hand
and how it is to be adjudicated. They are not concerned with the
rules of civil procedure published in the law books. They are, or at
least should be, concerned with every step the trial judge will take on
his or her way toward deciding the fate of their cause. While the liti-
gants are the ones most interested in the process of trial court deci-
sion-making, the public at-large has an equally compelling interest in
knowing how its judicial institutions actually operate.
From the lawyer's perspective, it helps to know exactly how a
judge is going to go about the business of making a decision so that
the lawyer may take steps along the way which are designed to influ-
ence the desired outcome.
From the judge's perspective, the quality of advocacy is en-
hanced when advocates know they will be called upon for input at
certain stages and when they play a role in shaping the process. They
will be better prepared and more likely to have the impression that
they are being treated fairly by an open minded decision-maker.
Open mindedness is a hallmark of any good judge, and a process that
projects this quality can only benefit the individual judge and the ju-
dicial system as a whole. The judge also ensures that there is outside
help at the proper stage, and gives literal meaning to the phrase
"three heads are better than one."
H. The Methods
The methods described are drawn from an amalgam of experi-
ences as both lawyer and judge. Some techniques have been "bor-
rowed" from judges I admired when practicing law. Others have
July/August 1998] METHODS OF TRIAL COURT
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been suggested to me by experienced judges for whom I have great
respect. A few I have devised out of necessity.
While the processes discussed are presented in the context of an
integrated system, they may be individually employed on a case by
case basis. Some of the devices are appropriate for the advocates to
suggest to the court, while others are strictly the prerogative of the
judge.
A. Summary of Methods
1. Recognizing inherent biases.
2. Appreciating discretion.
3. Disclosing biography, disclosing advance preparation and dis
closing methods to be used.
4. Preparing for the hearing/trial.
5. Arranging the courtroom for demeanor observation.
6. Delineating issues to be addressed.
7. Encouraging opening statements.
8. Maintaining formalities associated with a jury trial.
9. Inviting summations on facts.
10. Avoiding "Proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of
Law."
11. Avoiding the "who has the burden of proof?" trap.
12. Making findings of fact in open court immediately after the
proof is closed.
13. Inquiring about omitted findings.
14. Delineating issues on which briefs are requested.
15. In a bench trial, announcing the imputed jury instructions.
16. Applying the law in trial courts.
17. Writing an opinion.
18. Ensuring counsel are notified before the decision becomes
public.
B. Explanation
(1) Recognizing Possible Inherent Biases in Particular Cases
To acknowledge possible inherent biases of a decision-maker
caused by his or her mere existence on earth is neither new nor en-
lightening. Why else would an author call judicial neutrality a myth 8
18. See Kathleen E. Mahoney, Essay, The Myth of Judicial Neutrality: The Role of
Judicial Education in the Fair Administration of Justice, 32 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 785, 788
[Vol. 49
or write an article about the influence of the Italian-American expe-
rience on Italian-American judges?19 Why would so many state and
federal courts create commissions to study their own biases?" Could
it be claimed that "[o]ur court systems have recently confessed in at
least thirty-five jurisdictions that they are plagued with bias based on
gender"'" unless it were true? The mere creation of these task forces
and commissions, let alone their conclusions, is indelible proof of the
need to recognize the potential for personal background to impact
fact-finding and decision-making.
Once we recognize the potential for improper factors to influ-
ence judicial determinations, we begin eliminating them from the
process, or at least reducing their possible impact. Recognition of a
potential bias which may affect decision-making in a particular case is
the only way to prevent it from doing so. This recognition of the po-
tential is not, and need not, be a negative commentary that biases af-
fect the result. It is, rather, a positive step toward implementing
measures to prevent them from doing so.
(2) Appreciating the Power of Discretion in Trial Court Fact-finding
Judicial discretion at the trial court level exists both because the
judge is the only decision-maker present to evaluate the situation,
and because there can be no precise rule for every situation. If there
is no case on point by any appellate court, there is discretion in
shaping the ultimate decision, but no guarantee that the result will be
affirmed on appeal.' Findings of fact by a trial judge, however, are
rarely disturbed by an appellate court. Therefore, the trial court has
(1996).
19. See Peter A. Lauricella, Perspective Cm LASCIA LA VIA VECCHIA PER LA
NOUVA SA QUEL CHE PERDE E NON SA QUEL CHE TROVA: The Italian-American Ex-
perience and its Influence on the Judicial Philosophies of Justice Antonin Scalia, Judge Jo-
seph Bellacosa and Judge Vito Titone, 60 ALB. L. REV. 1701 (1997).
20. See, e.g., Report of the Special Committee on Gender Bias to the D.C. Circuit Task
Force on Gender, Race and Ethnic Bias, 84 GEO. L.J. 1657 (1996); Guidelines for Gender-
Neutral Courtroom Procedures, 60 TEx. BAR J. 166 (1997); Jeannette F. Swent, Gender
Bias at the Heart of Justice: An Empirical Study of State Task Forces, 6 S. CAL. REV. L. &
WOMEN'S STUD. 1 (1996).
21. Swent, supra note 20, at 1.
22. We shall not learn how judges think until the judges are able and ready to engage
in ventures of self-discovery.... Probably because to state that conclusion is to
acknowledge the existence of an important 'personal' element in that part of the
work of government performed by the courts. Those who dislike that 'personal'
element, therefore shy away from such an acknowledgement.
FRANK, LAW AND THE MODERN MIND, supra note 4, at 114.
23. See generally Maurice Rosenberg, Judicial Discretion of the Trial Court Viewed
From Above, 22 SYRACUSE L. REv. 635, 637 (1971).
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the greatest discretion in the finding of facts.
With discretion comes the potential for its abuse. The term
"abuse of discretion" is employed by appellate courts as a legal con-
cept to express the scope of review of trial court determinations. Use
the identical phrase in the context of fact-finding, and it takes on a
new, sinister meaning. The judge who abuses the discretion en-
trusted to him/her when finding facts corrupts the fact-finding proc-
ess.
Rulings on evidentiary matters are mostly discretionary. The
court may choose to admit or reject evidence. A trial judge has the
power to filter out evidence which may be important to the ultimate
determination by sustaining objections to that evidence. The court
may admit evidence for a limited purpose. The court may allow evi-
dence and announce that objections go to the weight it may be given,
not its admissibility. The court has discretion to accept all, part or
none of a witness' testimony, and place reliance on one credibility
factor 4 as to one witness and ignore it as to others. A trial judge's
appreciation of the awesome power of discretion in fact-finding is
critical to the proper discharge of the court's responsibilities.
(3) Disclosure
a. Disclosing Biography
Jerome Frank expressed the hope that some day judges would
publish "detailed autobiographies containing the sort of material that
24. A standard jury charge on credibility would entail instructions to the effect that,
in assessing credibility, jurors may consider:
1. The witness' appearance, attitude, and behavior on the stand, and the way the
witness testified;
2. the witness' age, intelligence and experience;
3. the witness' opportunity and ability to see or hear the things about which the
witness testified;
4. the accuracy of the witness' memory;
5. any motive of the witness to tell or not to tell the truth;
6. any interest or disinterest the witness may have in the outcome of the case;
7. any bias of the witness;
8. prior criminal convictions of the witness;
9. prior inconsistent statements, if applicable;
10. prior bad acts, if applicable;
11. prior actions of the witness that suggest truthfulness or untruthfulness;
12. the internal consistency of the witness' testimony and its support or contra-
diction by other evidence;
13. the reasonableness or plausibility of the witness' account.
See, e.g., JOSEPHINE R. POTUTO, ET AL., FEDERAL CRIMINAL JURY INSTRUCTIONS §
3.04 (2d ed. 1991).
[Vol. 49
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is recounted in the autobiographical novel" or write opinions with
explanations of the personal background factors which affected the
result.2 Some appellate courts publish a biography of their entire
bench. The New York Law Journal features a segment, "Profiles
from the Bench," which provides background information about the
featured judge. A lawyer has taken upon himself to publish a tout
sheet on each judge assigned to the civil division of the highest trial
court in New York highlighting idiosyncrasies and providing detailed
biographical profiles including birth date, education, interests and ac-
tivities, memberships in organizations and awards, political affilia-
tion, recent publications, teaching and speaking engagements, appel-
late record, recent cases and court rules.2 The book also solicits
answers to a survey about what attorneys feel should be included in
the next edition.
Lawyers are interested in both the professional and personal
backgrounds of judges. In a custody dispute, the lawyers are natu-
rally curious about whether the judge was ever a parent. In a divorce.
case, lawyers might be interested to know whether the judge has ever
been married, and, if so, whether ever divorced. A judge's ownership
of rental property might be of interest to litigants in a landlord-tenant
matter.
The different types of life experiences which bear upon a judge's
makeup are ultimately unfathomable. What is obvious, however, is
that they may affect the judge's perception, and further, that lawyers
know it. That is why smart attorneys are interested in acquiring in-
formation about judges, from any source. They speak informally
with judges during lulls in the action, but then store the information
away for later strategic use. They collect scouting reports on judges
from other lawyers and read biographical data about judges.
The method of disclosure is not important. It could be in written
form posted in the judge's office or assigned courtroom. It can be
verbally provided on a case by case basis where appropriate. And,
just because full and complete disclosure is unachievable does not re-
duce the importance of disclosure of as much information as the
judge feels comfortable in disclosing. Information about marital
status, children, education, military experience and employment
during school might be described. All experience in the practice of
law should be listed so that attorneys know, for instance, if the judge
worked in a large firm, as a sole practitioner, as a prosecutor, or a
25. FRANK, LAW AND THE MODERN MIND, supra note 4, at 115. My law clerk even
suggested that until recent years there was no need for autobiographies because most
judges have been white men whose autobiographies would be stereotypical.
26. CANNATA, NEW YORK JUDGE REVIEWS AND COURT DIRECrORY (1997-98).
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public defender. Some information, in whatever form, will undoubt-
edly be helpful for attorneys to know, especially those from "out of
town" or those who do not regularly appear before the particular
judge.
b. Disclosing Advance Preparation
Disclosure of advance preparation is important. Lawyers should
not be placed in the position of guessing how much the judge knows
about the lawsuit or the law. While lawyers might assume that a
judge prepares for the hearing or trial, the nature and extent of
preparation (exhaustive, perfunctory, etc.) should nevertheless be
stated. This will explain the context of the court's questions of coun-
sel and aid counsel in determining the appropriate response.
c. Disclosing the Methods to be Used
Disclosure of those methods the court intends to employ in ad-
judicating the particular matter is, first and foremost, the honesty liti-
gants deserve. It also encourages quality advocacy by allowing the
participants to know, in advance, the procedure by which the matter
will be resolved. It even allows the lawyers an opportunity to suggest
variations which may be suitable for the particular case.
Additionally, disclosure of the methods the court intends to use
for the particular case insures that the lawyers will be ready to re-
spond when called upon. The extent of the lawyers' preparation may
affect the correctness of the outcome. For example, if the judge in-
tends to make findings of fact and conclusions of law immediately af-
ter the hearing, but the lawyers assume that there will be time al-
lowed for post-hearing briefs, somebody (probably counsel) is going
to be unprepared. Somebody else (the one in the robe) is going to
appear to act precipitously. Worse yet, the court may miss an impor-
tant point and reach a reversible result because the lawyers were de-
prived of the opportunity to submit legal authority.
(4) Preparing for the Hearing/Trial
Familiarity with the rudimentary principles applicable to a legal
controversy and the fact questions which require adjudication is in-
dispensable. Advance preparation allows the court to know what to
listen for and to recognize what is missing. Disposition of a relevance
objection often turns upon the elements of a claim or defense. With-
out knowledge of the pertinent substantive law, a trial judge is une-
quipped to make proper evidentiary rulings.
Advance preparation enhances the capability of the trial judge to
make findings on the record immediately after the proceeding be-
HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 49
cause he or she is familiar with the law and knows what facts must be
addressed by a finding of fact. Finally, advance preparation facili-
tates a more expeditious disposition of the entire matter and often
will allow a bench decision to be rendered with confidence that it is
supported by both the findings of fact and controlling authority.
(5) Arranging the Courtroom for Demeanor Observation
The conventional witness stand should not be used. The witness
chair should face the judge to allow for observation of eye contact,
furtiveness, and all the other intangibles that make up demeanor.
Examining counsel should be encouraged to stand in an area near the
bench so that the witness is more likely to speak to the judge in an-
swering questions.
(6) Delineating the Issues to be Addressed
Before the hearing or trial begins, preferably days before at the
time of its scheduling, the issues to be adjudicated should be spread
upon the record to insure that the judge and lawyers know who has
the burden of going forward and what proof must be marshaled to
meet the required legal standard.
(7) Encouraging Opening Statements in Hearings and Trials
Judges should encourage lawyers to make opening statements in
both hearings and trials. A well-prepared attorney is capable of
making a cogent opening in a short period of time. Listening to
openings allows the judge to view the importance of testimony from
the perspective of each lawyer, and to know what evidence to expect
and in what order so that he/she can make sense of it as it comes in.
(8) Maintaining Formalities Associated With a Jury Trial
Counsel and the judge should maintain all formalities associated
with a jury trial. Questions by the court should be kept to a mini-
mum. Preparation for the proceeding is not intended to make it pos-
sible for the judge to look smart and ask all the right questions. If
anything, its purpose is to enable the judge to recognize that the right
questions are not being asked.
For a trial court to say that it "takes" inadmissible evidence "for
what it's worth" because "there's no jury here, counselor" is wrong
for a number of reasons. First, it conveys the possibly false impres-
sion that the trier of fact (the court) will not be affected by it. Sec-
ond, it complicates matters because the judge has yet another "im-
proper" consideration to put out of his/her mind. Third, it is unfair to
July/August 19981 METHODS OF TRLAL COURT
the litigants because they should have the same rules of evidence ap-
plied that would be applied in a jury trial. Fourth, it is unfair since
the judge knows that any error will be deemed harmless because the
appellate court will assume that the trial judge did what is almost im-
possible to do-ignore the inadmissible evidence. Fifth, it conveys an
effete view that judges are automatons unaffected by such evidence.
(9) Inviting Summations on the Facts
Too often, when proof is closed, there is a curt "decision re-
served" uttered by a departing judge. Summations provide the op-
portunity for true advocacy and persuasion, and by requesting them,
the court affirms that the art of persuasion is not wasted on a law
trained fact finder. Inviting summations will, at a bare minimum,
avoid the appearance of giving the litigants short shrift. It will also
allow the court to gain insight as to reasons to believe or disbelieve
particular witnesses, and help the court avoid missing an important
aspect of testimony. Summation in a bench trial or hearing also al-
lows the court to question attorneys as to what is important to them
and why.
(10) Avoiding "Proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law"
The routine post-hearing/trial document entitled "Proposed
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law" (PFFCL) should be
avoided because it compresses two distinct segments of decision-
making into one, and, thereby, deprives litigants of effective repre-
sentation, and its use detracts from the appearance of a hardworking,
independent judge.
Throughout law school we learned about conclusions of law
made by appellate courts based upon "found" facts. In taking law
school and bar examinations, we were given a set of undisputed facts,
the "given facts," and were asked to draw those conclusions of law
necessary to answer the posed questions. In most of our appellate
courts, we argue about conclusions of law reached by the trial court
based on "findings of fact" which are rarely disturbed. If this is how
we have been taught to demonstrate our positions on legal issues,
how can a trial court expect a lawyer to present a cogent legal argu-
ment for a particular conclusion of law before the facts are "given"?
The reality is that it is very difficult for counsel to advance points and
authorities for proposed conclusions of law until the facts are known.
Another problem in using a PFFCL is that it makes it too con-
venient for the judge to choose between two scenarios rather than
devote the time necessary to do what the law requires: fashion a third
scenario based upon those portions of the testimony s/he believed.
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The court's involvement in a process whereby the exact verbiage of a
submission by one of the litigants later finds its way into the court's
decision does little to enhance the reputation of the judiciary.
Once the proof is closed, the next step should be the singular one
of fact-finding-a task for the judge, not one of the advocates.
(11) Avoiding the "Who has the burden of proof?" Trap
What should a judge acting as fact finder do when s/he does not
know who to believe? Some judges fall into the trap of resorting to
the burden of proof as a subconscious subterfuge to avoid confront-
ing his or her responsibility to make credibility determinations. The
judge avoids confronting the problem of credibility assessment by
confessing that he or she cannot determine who to believe, and, as a
result, the party with the burden of proof must lose. This application
of the burden of proof has been articulated as an appropriate method
of fact-finding technique both in informal discussion amongst judges
and even in a decision-making course.' By resorting to this practice,
however, the judge not only shirks the responsibility of finding the
facts, but also condenses two discrete stages of the dispute resolution
process into one.
The parties are entitled to have the judge apply the same law
that a jury would be required to follow.2 In a civil case, where the
plaintiff has the burden of proving the case by a preponderance of
the credible evidence, there is a two step procedure: (1) determine
the credible evidence; and (2) apply the burden of proof. This two
step process may be likened to one where there are two credibility
sifters, one labeled "evidence favoring plaintiff" and the other "evi-
dence favoring defendant." All of the evidence favoring plaintiff's
27. National Judicial College, supra note 14, at 6-2.
28. The New York Pattern Jury Instructions state:
The burden of proof rests on the plaintiff. That means that it must be estab-
lished by a fair preponderance of the credible evidence that the claim plaintiff
makes is true. The credible evidence means the testimony or exhibits that you find
to be worthy to be believed. A preponderance of the evidence means the greater
part of such evidence. That does not mean the greater number of witnesses or
the greater length of time taken by either side. The phrase refers to the quality
of the evidence, that is, its convincing quality, the weight and the effect that it
has on your minds. The law requires that in order for the plaintiff to prevail on a
claim, the evidence that supports (his, her) claim must appeal to you as more
nearly representing what took place than the evidence opposed to (his, her)
claim. If it does not, or if it weighs so evenly that you are unable to say that
there is a preponderance on either side, then you must decide the question in fa-
vor of the defendant. It is only if the evidence favoring the plaintiff's claim out-
weighs the evidence opposed to it that you can find in favor of plaintiff.
New York Pattern Jury Instructions § 1:23 (emphasis added).
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side is poured into the credibility sifter of the trier of fact. What is not
believed falls through. The residue is the "credible evidence." The
same process is repeated for evidence favoring the defendant. That is
step one. Step two consists of placing the residue from plaintiff's and
defendant's sifters on opposite sides of a scale. Unless plaintiff's
credible evidence tips the scale, defendant prevails.29
The law does not require the fact finder to choose between the
testimony of two witnesses. When a judge says "I don't know who to
believe," what s/he may really mean is "I have run the witnesses for
both sides through my separate credibility sifters, and I believe wit-
nesses on each side of the case." The law allows the trier of fact to
find both plaintiff's and defendant's witnesses credible. Then. and
only then, is the next step to apply the burden of proof to resolve the
issue.
Therefore, just as a jury must first determine what evidence it
found believable before applying the burden of proof, so too must
the judge.
(12) Making Findings of Fact in Open Court Immediately After the Proof is
Closed
Judges should make findings of fact on the record in the pres-
ence of the parties at the conclusion of the hearing whenever possi-
ble. This practice merely requires good note taking." Clearly there
are times when reserving decision or ordering a transcript is required,
but few would dispute that "decision reserved" is a statement made
all too frequently and unnecessarily at the conclusion of short hear-
ings. Making findings at the conclusion of the hearing immediately
after summations serves the following purposes:
a. Since both the evidence and the demeanor of the witnesses are
29. The same holds true in the criminal case where the jury is instructed that each
juror must be satisfied that the credible evidence is sufficient to convince each beyond a
reasonable doubt of the defendant's guilt. The only difference in the criminal case is, ab-
sent the assertion of an affirmative defense, there is only one sifter for all of the evidence.
Our law, therefore, requires that before the jury may convict the defendant,
each of you must be satisfied that the credible evidence is sufficient to convince
you beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant is in fact guilty. Therefore,
the first duty of each juror is to consider and weigh all the evidence in the case
and decide which you believe is credible and worthy of your consideration. The
next duty of each juror is to determine whether the juror has, in fact, a reason-
able doubt of the defendant's guilt as that term is defined in our law.
New York Criminal Jury Instructions § 6.20 (emphasis added).
30. For example: take notes of direct on lined paper, skipping every other line; use a
different colored ink to take notes during cross and enter the information "between the
lines" of and corresponding to the subjects elicited on direct; make notes of new matter
brought out on cross on a separate sheet of paper.
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fresh in the judge's mind, there is a greater likelihood that credibility
determinations will be based on all appropriate criteria, not merely
printed words on a transcript page reviewed weeks or even months
later.
b. While most judges who prepare for a hearing know the gen-
eral principles applicable before the hearing starts, they do not know
everything about all of the issues which may arise during the pro-
ceeding. When a judge makes findings immediately after the hear-
ing/trial, without regard for what the law is, he or she is prevented
from tailoring his or her findings to some intuitive or, worse yet, cor-
rupt result that he or she arrives upon weeks later in chambers.
c. The announcement of findings of fact from the bench at the
conclusion of a hearing allows the judge to tell the litigants face-to-
face who he or she believed and why. This process demonstrates that
the court is an independent institution where the judge has no reser-
vations about stating his or her findings in the presence of those he or
she chose not to believe.
d. Spreading findings of fact upon the record at the conclusion of
the hearing avoids unnecessary delay and additional attorney's fees
which might be incurred by the litigants during the submission of
proposed findings of fact following the hearing.
e. When the court makes findings of fact from the bench, the
case has been moved along to the next step in the process thereby
enhancing the likelihood of a prompt disposition of the case and
freeing up the judge for other matters. The judge becomes more effi-
cient by making the findings of fact from the bench after the hearing.
f. The practice of making findings of fact from the bench allows
the judge to delineate the legal issues upon which legal memoranda
need be submitted. Lawyers will not waste their time and their cli-
ents' money writing briefs on unimportant issues, and judges will not
waste time reading them.
g. When the judge makes findings from the bench, it cannot be
said that a law clerk, not the judge, is actually deciding the facts of
the case. This is a notion which is regrettably widespread, and one of
which lawyers must be disabused.
(13) Inquiring About Omitted Findings
There are times when a judge simply neglects to make a finding
of a crucial fact needed to support the ultimate result. If findings are
made in open court, the judge may ask counsel if a finding on a criti-
cal fact was inadvertently omitted. Even if the judge reserves deci-
sion on fact-finding and later issues written findings of fact, the invi-
tation to suggest additional facts may be extended at that time. In
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either event, the court ensures that it has not inadvertently left out a
fact which is found necessary to support the ultimate result.
(14) Delineating Issues on which Briefs are Requested
Once the court makes its findings of fact, they should be an-
nounced from the bench or distributed to counsel in writing with an
order directing the submission of memoranda on specific issues de-
lineated by the court.
(15) In a Bench Trial, Announcing the Imputed Jury Instruction
In a bench trial, before summations, the court should identify
those sections of the applicable pattern jury instructions, whether
civil or criminal, which the court would have read to the jury had it
been a jury trial. The parties should be explicitly informed of the
precise legal principles that will control the court's verdict before
summations are made.
(16) Applying the Law In Trial Courts
Once the facts have been determined, the issues for briefing de-
lineated, and memoranda submitted, the law must be applied to the
"found facts." Unlike the process of trial court fact-finding where the
literature is barren, scholarship on the subject of legal conclusion
drawing is plentiful.' This article is not the place for a debate about
those methods. It is, however, the place for their prioritization from
the perspective of the trial court decision-maker.
a. Mechanical Application
Ideally, a trial court can find an appellate case or a statute di-
rectly on point which governs the facts found by the court. Roscoe
Pound sarcastically praised this approach by observing that it limited
judicial ignorance and reduced the likelihood of corruption in the ju-
diciary." However, Pound's sarcasm is drawn from the context of
discussing appellate court, rather than trial court, decision-making.
Cardozo's sarcasm was more subtle. He metaphorically de-
scribed a simplistic method of decision-making which matched the
facts to the colors of precedent cards spread out upon a table, ex-
pressing fear that the person with the best assortment of color cards
31. See Wilentz, supra note 1, at 221.
32. See Roscoe Pound, Mechanical Jurisprudence, 8 COLUM. L. REV. 605, 608-610
(1908).
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would be regarded as the smartest judge.33 Cardozo felt that "No
judge of a high court worthy of his office, views the function of his
place so narrowly."' Yet, at the "lowly" trial court level, mechani-
cal, "narrow" application of established intermediate or highest ap-
pellate court precedent is what lawyers and litigants legitimately ex-
pect. What's more, stability in the law is dependent upon a trial
court's adherence to the legal doctrine of stare decisis. So, while
Pound and Cardozo would have little regard for the appellate judge
who searches for a case directly on point, that is exactly what the trial
judge is both sworn to do and expected to do by appellate courts.
b. Analogous Cases
In the absence of a case or statute directly on point, a trial court
necessarily looks to the results in those appellate decisions whose fact
patterns are most similar to the case under consideration. This proc-
ess differs from a mechanical approach not in concept, but in degree,
because the court must make a judgment that the difference in fact
patterns is not so great as to require a contrary result.' When a trial
court is employing the analogous cases approach, it is often helpful to
examine the record on appeal and briefs that led to published deci-
sion. Judges in jurisdictions where those records and briefs are read-
ily available" have an enormous advantage in ensuring that applica-
tion of the result reached in an analogous case is correct. They have
had the opportunity to verify that the determinative facts are sub-
stantially similar to the case then before them.
Neither the mechanical nor the analogous cases method of deci-
sion-making is rocket science. The methods do not even require an
analysis of the principles underlying the result reached by the appel-
late court. Indeed, as Cardozo and Pound point out, these ap-
proaches are not intellectually challenging.' Yet the legal doctrine of
stare decisis and the legitimate expectations of lawyers and litigants
require that they be considered first.
c. Identification and Application of Controlling Legal Principles
Although there may not be a case "on all fours" or an analogous
case, trial courts usually will have little difficulty in identifying the
controlling legal principle which may then be applied to the unique
facts at hand. Application of the identified principle does not involve
33. See CARDOZO, supra note 1, at 21.
34. See id. at 20.
35. In New York, briefs and records of intermediate and high court appeals are
available at libraries throughout the state.
36. See CARDOZO, supra note 1, at 20; Pound, supra note 32, at 608-10.
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any extrapolation, extension or gleaning of a new rule nor does it re-
quire the examination of underlying policies because the principle
may easily be identified in the controlling case precedent and merely
applied to the found facts.
d. Application of Logical Principles
Absent the identification of a controlling legal principle, the
more difficult process of trial court decision-making begins While
it is ordinarily not the job of trial courts to fashion new rules in order
to decide a trial court case, there may be times when a trial court
must create such rules in order to resolve the controversy presented.
The existing rules must be identified and the underlying policies upon
which they were fashioned examined to arrive at a new rule which
both furthers those policies and is a logical extension of the rules al-
ready formulated.
e. Public Policy, History, and Custom
In discussing more sophisticated aspects of the judicial process,
Cardozo said "We go forward with our logic, with our analogies, with
our philosophies, till we reach a certain point. At first, we have no
trouble with the paths; they follow the same lines. Then they begin to
diverge, and we must make a choice between them. 38 The "we"
Cardozo speaks of are appellate judges. Trial court judges may find
comfort in the numerous appellate court cases establishing rules
which ensure that there are more than sufficient tools with which to
make a decision. Trial courts are rarely confronted with divergent
paths where they must somehow sculpt new rules of law from the clay
of custom, social utility, an abstract sense of justice or "semi-intuitive
apprehension of the pervading spirit of our law".39 That is why, as
Judge Wyzanski has said, our most important job is fact-finding."0
(17) Writing an Opinion
This is easier said than done. The purpose of this article is not to
address the various techniques of opinion writing, the importance of
considering the audience and avoiding criticism of the lawyers or liti-
gants except in extreme circumstances. There is an abundance of lit-
erature on this subject which need only be footnoted here. "'
37. See Wilentz, supra note 1, at 234.
38. CARDOZO, supra note 1, at 43.
39. Id. at 43.
40. See Wyzanski, supra note 1, at 212.
41. See generally Becker, In Praise of Footnotes, 74 WASH. U. L.Q. 1 (1996):
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(18) Ensuring Counsel are Notified Before the Decision Becomes Public
It is important for a court to ensure that counsel, and the liti-
gants through their counsel, are informed of the decision before it is
filed as a public record. This avoids situations like those where news
reporters, court clerks or other lawyers make mention of the result to
an attorney of record who has not yet learned that a decision has
been reached, or even worse, where clients find out about the result
of a decision by hearing about it on the radio or reading about it in
the newspaper. By allowing counsel the opportunity to obtain a copy
of the opinion before it is filed as a public record, counsel are able to
inform clients and respond to inquiries by others about the decision.
HI. The Need for More Methods
There are many techniques employed by trial judges with dec-
ades of experience which have never been reduced to writing. Like
the recipes of beloved grandmothers, proven ingredients for success-
ful trial court fact-finding and decision-making will not be passed on
to new and aspiring judges unless we do something to preserve them.
We cannot accept "cook it 'til its done" advice from our most experi-
enced judges. We must insist upon specific methods in writing. If we
do, then hopefully, some day, there will be the same vast field of lit-
erature on the subject of trial court fact-finding which already exists
on the subject of appellate court decision-making and legal opinion
writing.
Until then, the search continues.
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